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Abstract 
Following the successful outcomes of the national team, that finished third in the 2002 FIFA World Cup, 
and the positive club performance in the UEFA competitions at the beginning of the new millennium, 
Turkish football was expected to reaffirm and further develop in the following years, exploiting also the 
favourable economic conditions.  However, its growth and evolution did not meet the expectations, and 
in the latest years several managerial aspects of the Turkish Football Federation have begun to be 
questioned, which led the federation itself to reform football in areas such as foreign players’ quota, 
financial requirements and stadiums. The main aim of this article is to identify and discuss these issues 
and how effective the reforms implemented by the Turkish Football Federation have been in the short 
run through the application of the historical method and the use of secondary data. Our results show that 
these reforms do not seem to have had a significant impact so far, and while some of them likely need 
more time for their effects to be tangible, the general impression is that Turkish football would need a 
different approach and more incisive policy interventions. 
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Introduction 
Modern football appeared for the first time in Turkish lives at the end of 19th century, when mercantile 
ports such as İzmir and Selanik were introduced to the new sport by British merchants, that founded the 
first team - Football Club Smyrna - in 1894 (1). Football became rapidly popular as it was practiced also 
by other ethnicities present in the country, such as Italians, Rums and Armenians: indeed, it was when 
Rums moved to İstanbul that football was established in the main Turkish city (1).  
The first Turkish football club founded by locals, Galatasaray Sport Club, was established in 1905 and 
immediately followed by Fenerbahçe Sport Club in 1907 and Beşiktaş Gymnastics Club in 1910 (2). 
These three clubs, alongside Trabzonspor Sport Club, have historically dominated domestic 
competitions, as shown by Table 1. The national governing body – the Turkish Football Federation (TFF) 
– was instead established in 1923 and immediately became a member of FIFA.
Table 1 about here 
Throughout the 20th century, both the national team and the Turkish clubs struggled to achieve 
international success: only in 1996 Turkey managed to qualify for the first time to the final stage of the 
UEFA European Championships, and no UEFA competition for club had ever been won by a Turkish 
side (3).   
The beginning of the new millennium saw a significant improvement of the international performance 
of the Turkish national team and can be considered the golden age of Turkish football. In 2000, Turkey 
qualified for the second time to the final stage of the UEFA European Championships and reached the 
tournament’s quarter-final; in 2002, they qualified for the first time to the final stage of the FIFA World 
Cup and surprisingly achieved the third place. Ten players of that team belonged to Galatasaray, that in 
2000 won the UEFA Cup and Super Cup and in 2001 reached the Champions League quarter-final, 
leading Turkey to the sixth place in the UEFA country ranking (UEFA.com). 
Therefore, Turkish football seemed to be at a turning point of its history and to emerge as the main 
challenger of the top 5 European nations (England, France, Germany, Italy and Spain). This growth could 
be further sustained by the positive economic trend experienced by the country in the first fifteen years 
of the new millennium: apart from the financial crisis of 2001, Turkey recorded a 7.5% annual increase 
in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between 2002 and 2006 – its highest ever rate since 1960s – and 
a 5% annual increase between 2007 and 2015, with the national economy that has not been particularly 
affected by the global financial crisis and a poverty incidence more than halved (OECD.org). 
Despite these ideal conditions, Turkish football did not progress as expected and its international 
performance turned out to be quite disappointing. This poor on-field performance has been accompanied 
by a worsening of the financial conditions of the Turkish clubs and by frequent episodes of hooliganism 
harming the reputation of Turkish football. This paper aims to investigate the causes identified by the 
Turkish federation for the disappointing on-field and financial performance of the domestic football, the 
reform interventions designed to tackle these issues and the short-run impact of these reforms. Section 1 
will briefly describe the methodology used, whereas Section 2 will show the effects of changes in the 
foreign players’ quota, the new sanctions for financial violations and the interventions to tackle 
hooliganism respectively. A discussion of the results is presented in Section 3, followed by conclusions 
and some reflections about the future development of Turkish football.  
1. Methodology
This research adopts a historical case-study approach, considered by Amis and Silk (4) particularly 
valuable for its contribution to the evolution of sport management theory as it enables researchers to 
clarify important questions related to the social, political, economic, historical, and cultural factors 
impacting on the sport industry. This approach not only helps a better understanding of the contemporary 
evolution of sport management, but also potentially points to possible future changes and improvements, 
which are desirable qualities for sport managers (5), and, more importantly, highlights that events and 
crucial decisions are not merely a product of exogenous forces but of a human decision making process, 
so that the study of the history of a specific institution or organization is a relevant method of inquiry for 
sport management since every topic possesses a context or history (6).  
Once identified the three main areas of reform in Turkish football in the last decade - the foreign players’ 
quota, the sanctions for financial violations and hooliganism – secondary data from different sources 
have been collected to understand the rationale for the reform interventions and to conduct and ex-ante 
and ex-post evaluation of the situation in each of the three areas in order to analyse the effectiveness of 
TFF’s reforms through a descriptive statistical approach.  
2. Results
2.1 Foreign Players’ Quota in Turkish Football 
In the period between 2002 and 2015, the Turkish national team never qualified again to the final stage 
of the FIFA World Cup, and only twice (2008, when they reached the semi-final, and 2016) reached the 
final stage of the UEFA European Championships. In the same period, also the performance of Turkish 
clubs in UEFA competitions was not in line with the expectations: the best achievements were two 
Champions League quarter-finals (Fenerbahçȩ in 2008, Galatasaray in 2013), a Europa League semi-
final (Fenerbahçȩ, 2013) and a UEFA Cup quarter-final (Besiktas, 2003). Consequently, Turkey dropped 
to the 14th place – their lowest rank - in the UEFA country ranking in 2007, and in 2013 – the best year 
for Turkish clubs in UEFA competitions in the period considered – they were still in 10th position, 
overtaken by Portugal, Netherlands, Russia and Ukraine if compared with 2001 (UEFA.com).  
In 2014, Fatih Terim, the then manager of the Turkish national team and one of the historical figures in 
Turkish football, was the first to state publicly the need for deep reforms in the domestic football system 
(7). The main issue identified by the special unit created by TFF to reform domestic football was the 
quota of foreign players allowed to be part of a Turkish club. TFF imposed the first restriction on foreign 
players in 1951, when Turkish clubs were allowed to sign only one foreign player, and this quota held 
until 1996, when, as a consequence of the Bosman ruling that revolutionized the European football 
transfer market system (8), it was increased to 3+1 (three players on the pitch, one player on the bench). 
As shown in Table 2, the liberalization of the athletes’ labour market  experienced by the European Union 
(EU) countries after the Bosman ruling (9,10) pushed Turkey – not an official member of EU despite a 
Custom Union signed in 1996 – to repeated changes in the rule regulating the foreign players’ quota in 
Turkish football, in an attempt to preserve the international competitiveness of domestic clubs and, at the 
same time, the development of home-grown talent. In the middle of the 1998-1999 season, TFF further 
increased the foreign players’ quota to five players, whether on the pitch or not (11), whereas in 2001-
2002 a 5+1+2 system was introduced. According to this system, a maximum of eight players could be 
part of the roster of a Turkish club, but no more than five players could be at the same time on the pitch 
and only one player could start as a potential substitute (12). The rule changed again in the following 
seasons: in 2005-2006, Turkish clubs could have a maximum of six foreign players in their roster, 
whether on the pitch or not; in 2007-08 they went back to a 6 + 1 system (13), whereas in 2008-09 the 
quota was increased to eight with a 6+2 system, and in 2010-11 to ten with a 6+2+2 system.  
In 2011-2012, for the first time, Turkish clubs could sign an unlimited number of foreign players, but the 
6+2 system still regulated their line-up. In 2013-14 the quota was reduced again, with Turkish clubs 
allowed to sign only ten players and line up six – whether on the pitch or not. In the following season the 
number of foreign players was further reduced, with a maximum number of eight players to be signed 
and a 5+3 line-up system. 
The critical analysis inspired by the TFF and the Union of Turkish clubs and aimed to identify the causes 
of the disappointing performance of domestic football at international level led to the conclusion that the 
foreign players’ quota was penalizing for both the on-field and the financial performance. On the one 
hand, it prevented a more substantial inflow of players with heterogeneous backgrounds and skills, which 
could represent a positive factor for the on-field efficiency of the domestic clubs and a key factor for the 
development of the home-grown players, that could benefit from the competition and the daily 
interactions with foreign players (14, 15, 16). On the other hand, it favoured the protectionism of the 
home-grown players leading to an inflation of the teams’ payrolls, as Turkish clubs were forced to keep 
in their roster a minimum amount of home-grown players, whose bargaining power consequently 
increased.  
Therefore, TFF’s decision was to adopt the so-called ’14 home-grown players rule’: football clubs could 
have a maximum of twenty-eight players in their roster and at least fourteen of them had to be eligible 
for playing in the Turkish national team. Consequently, the other fourteen members of the roster could 
be foreign players, and eleven of them could be lined up, whether on the pitch or on the bench, which 
means that, for the first time, all the eleven starters could be foreigners.   
Table 2 about here 
The new rule has been applied for the following three seasons, and, as shown in Figure 1 and 2, has 
produced an immediate increase in the percentage of foreign players in Turkish clubs (from 33.9% in 
2014-15 to 52.9% in 2017-18) and in the percentage of transfers involving foreign players in the Turkish 
Super League (from 38% to 61%). Moreover, the average wage/revenue ratio has decreased from 89% 
in 2014-15 to 71% in 2017-18 (UEFA.com), and the average amount of money spent every year for the 
twenty most expensive internal transfers of Turkish players between 2015-16 and 2017-18 has dropped 
by 37% in comparison with the average of the previous seven seasons (transfermarket.co.uk). Although 
the impact on the on-field performance would require a longer period of time to be properly evaluated, 
so far there is no evidence of significant improvements: the national team failed to qualify for the 2018 
FIFA World Cup, whereas the best achievement of a Turkish club in the UEFA competitions was the 
Europa League quarter-final reached by Besiktas in 2016-17. 
Figure 1. The Ratio of Foreign Players on Turkish Football Clubs (2010-11 to 2017-18) 
Source: Transfermarkt.co.uk 
Figure 2. The Ratio of Foreign Player Transfers in Turkish Super League (2010-11 to 2017-18) 
Source: Transfermarkt.co.uk 
2.2. Sanctions for financial violations 
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The poor on-field performance of Turkish national team and clubs between 2002 and 2015 has been 
accompanied by a worsening of the financial conditions of the Turkish clubs: in 2015, 13 out of 18 Super 
League clubs were making a loss, the total liabilities of the Big 4 (Galatasaray, Fenerbahçȩ, Besiktas, 
Trabzonspor) exceeded 1.18 billion euros, and the average wage/revenue ratio was 87% in 2015 (51% in 
2009). Moreover, Galatasaray was banned from UEFA competitions in 2016-17 for failing to meet the 
recently introduced Financial Fair Play (FFP) requirements for 2015-16 (UEFA.com). 
The change in the foreign players’ quota that, as we have seen, led to a significant reduction in the average 
wage/revenue ratio has not been sufficient to produce the necessary improvements required by FFP yet. 
Consequently, in January 2016 TFF established stricter financial requirements and heavier sanctions for 
financial violations aiming to stimulate a more virtuous behavior by Turkish clubs. These modifications 
can be summarized as follows (TFF, 2016): 
• Financial statements must be presented every six months and receive approval certificate from
Independent Audit Companies or Sworn Financial Advisors
• In case of delay in the presentation of the approval certificate, the club will be notified a 60-day
warning: if at the expiration date the certificate has not been presented yet, the club will be
punished with one penalty point
• In case of overdue debts to other football clubs, the club will be notified a 60-day warning: if at
the expiration date the debts have not been extinguished yet, the club will be punished with three
penalty points
• In case of overdue debts to other personnel, the club will be notified a 60-day warning: if at the
expiration date the debts have not been extinguished yet, the club will be punished with three
penalty points
• In case of overdue debts to Social Security Institution (SSI) and Tax Affairs, the club will be
notified a 60-day warning: if at the expiration date the debts have not been extinguished yet, the
club will be punished with three penalty points.
These new regulations have certainly had an immediate impact on the general financial performance of 
Super League clubs, as in 2017 only nine clubs were in loss compared to thirteen in 2015, but has still 
not contributed to the improvement of the financial situation of the Big 4, whose total liabilities increased 
by 24% between 2016 and 2018 (www.kap.gov.tr). Not surprisingly, all the Big 4 were under a certain 
type of settlement regime at the start of 2018-19 in relation to FFP: Besiktas was under a mere settlement 
regime, whereas Fenerbahçȩ and Trabzonspor were under settlement regime with transfer restrictions 
and the limitation on the number of players in the List A for the UEFA competition they took part in, and 
Galatasaray under settlement regime with a fine of 6 million euros and the limitation on the number of 
players in the List A (UEFA.com).  
2.3. Hooliganism 
Hooliganism has been a constant plague of Turkish football, as pointed out by Ozbay et al. (17) and 
Keddie (18) that analysed the historical motivations of such phenomenon. The period between 2002 and 
2015 saw an intensification of violence episodes linked to football (18). In the 2003-04 season, a 
Karşıyaka fan was murdered during the first round match of the Turkish Cup, and Gaziantepspor‘s fans 
set a stand on fire during a match against Fenerbahçȩ. In 2009-10, during the Fenerbahce-Galatasaray 
derby, an assistant referee was struck by a lighter thrown from the stands, whereas in 2012-13 a 19-year-
old student was stabbed to death on the day of another Istanbul derby between Fenerbahçȩ and 
Galatasaray just because he was wearing a Fenerbahce shirt. In 2013-14, Besiktas’ midfielder Manuel 
Fernandes was kicked to the ground by a pitch invader during Besiktas-Kasimpasa and Galatasaray’s 
forward Burak Yilmaz suffered a serious face injury when he was hit by a pocketknife thrown from the 
stands during the match against Çaykur Rizespor (18). 
This violence escalation led the Turkish government to introduce the so-called Violence Law in 2011 
(17), whose full implementation did not occur before 2014. Inspired by similar legislation implemented 
in England, France, Italy and Switzerland, the Violence Law’s main aim was to make stadiums safer 
places. Therefore, Turkish stadiums are now required to include at least two waiting (or detention) rooms 
and control rooms with security cameras accessible by police and private security, and all their seats have 
to be numbered. Moreover, weapons, explosives, other inflammables, drugs and alcohol are banned from 
stadiums, and club officials and fan representatives are required to assist police and private security. 
Finally, starting from 2014-15, all tickets are sold through an electronic card, the so-called Passolig. 
Passolig is compulsory to attend a game and embodies also the fans’ personal information, that is stored 
by TFF and shared with the Ministry of Finance and Internal Affairs. Those producing, selling or 
possessing fake e-tickets will be sentenced up to 4 years. More in general, a felony against the Violence 
Law may result in an attendance ban, and the banned person must report to the nearest police station at 
kickoff and one hour after the game has started.  
Figure 3 shows that Passolig has had an immediate negative impact on Turkish football stadium 
attendance in the first two seasons after its introduction. The average capacity utilization dropped from 
46% to 25% (UEFA.com) mainly because of the fans’ diffidence towards the perceived commercial 
nature of the electronic card, as the personal information embodied in it could be accessible to third 
parties. Attendance has then started increasing in 2016-17 and reached the pre-Passolig level in 2017-
18, which proves that Turkish fans have now accepted the new rule that, however, has not contributed to 
a significant reduction of the hooliganism episodes. 
Figure 3. The effects of Passolig on attendance (2010-11 to 2017-18) 
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hooliganism is an issue far from being resolved, which pushed Ulker, a major Turkish manufacturer of 
food products and one of the largest sports sponsors in the country, to withdraw their funding from 
football after investing €190m in 10 years (19). In 2014-15, in Trabzon, just a few hours after the game 
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own stadium and invaded the pitch, whereas in 2017-18 the derby between Fenerbahçe and Beşiktaş was 
abandoned after Beşiktaş' coach Şenol Güneş got injured by objects flung from the stands (18). All these 
episodes show that also this reform has not proved to be particularly effective in the short run. 
3. Discussion
Following the successful outcomes of the Turkish national team and clubs at the beginning of the new 
millennium, Turkish football has not developed as expected, considering also the favourable economic 
conditions. The short-run effects of the reforms implemented since 2014 in order to re-boost Turkish 
football do not seem to be very significant so far.  
The increase in the foreign players’ quota is probably the policy change that needs more time to have 
tangible effects and, consequently, to be evaluated, as it aims to impact on the on-field performance of 
clubs and national team. However, increasing the foreign players’ quota without investing at the same 
time in the development of youth academies could turn out to be ineffective. The models to follow should 
be Netherlands, Portugal and Belgium, whose leagues cannot be compared to the top 5 European leagues 
in terms of attractiveness and visibility, but that are acknowledged as countries particularly capable of 
nurturing and developing domestic talent. The consequences are a good – sometimes high – 
competitiveness of clubs and national team and a healthy financial situation of the clubs themselves, that 
increase their profit through the sale of the home-grown players to the European big clubs. Setting a 
budget share to be invested in the development of the youth academies as a compulsory requirement for 
all the Turkish clubs could then be beneficial in terms of both on-field and financial performance, as it 
would stimulate clubs to be financially virtuous through a positive approach and not only by making the 
sanctions for violations more severe, especially if we take into account the currency and debt crisis hitting 
the country in 2018. On top of that, Turkish clubs should imitate the three above-mentioned countries 
also in terms of foreign players’ acquisition and buy young talent from peripheral leagues to develop and 
re-sell to the European big clubs rather than continuing to buy players in an advanced stage of their career 
from the top 5 European leagues. As regards hooliganism, it is probably the toughest issue to tackle, as 
violence is endemic to Turkish society, as highlighted by Keddie (18). On top of that, some fan groups 
are associated with political movements, that often use football as a means for their anti-government 
protests. Therefore, it is not surprising that Violence Law and Passolig have had so far a very limited 
effect, and their implementation would definitely benefit from a more peaceful social climate.  
Conclusions 
Even though at the beginning of the new millennium Turkish football seemed to emerge as the main 
challenger of the top 5 European nations, sustained also by favourable economic conditions, its 
development in the following years did not meet the expectations, which led the Turkish Football 
Federation to identify and critically analyse three main reform areas: the foreign players’ quota, the clubs’ 
financial behaviour and hooliganism. 
So far, the reform interventions have been not very effective: a) the increase in the number of foreign 
players allowed per team has not contributed to a better performance of Turkish clubs in the international 
competitions; b) more severe sanctions for financial violations have not led to a substantial improvement 
of the financial situation of the Big 4, that were under a certain type of settlement regime at the start of 
2018-19 in relation to FFP; c) the introduction of Passolig has not prevented the occurrence of serious 
incidents in Turkish stadiums.  
Even though the TFF’s reform effort is appreciable, a different approach would probably be needed: 
taking inspiration from nations such as Netherlands, Portugal and Belgium, an incisive policy aimed to 
invest in the development of the youth academies could be beneficial in terms of both on-field and 
financial performance. As regards hooliganism, it is probably the toughest issue to tackle, as violence is 
endemic to Turkish society and some fan groups are associated with political movements: therefore, any 
reform effort risks to be ineffective without a more peaceful social climate. 
Applicable remarks 
1. TFF may set a budget share to be invested in the development of the youth academies as a compulsory
requirement for all the Turkish clubs. 
2. Turkish clubs should modify their approach: they should nurture and develop home-grown players and
buy young talent from peripheral leagues to develop and re-sell to the European big clubs rather than 
continuing to buy players in an advanced stage of their career. 
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Table 1. Domestic Honours of the Turkish Big 4. 
Trophy Galatasaray SK Fenerbahçe SK Beşiktaş JK Trabzonspor SK 
Super League 20 19 15 6 
Turkish Cup 17 6 9 8 
T. Super Cup 15 9 8 8 
Source: Turkish Football Federation 
Table 2. The evolution of the foreign players’ quota (1998 – 2018) 
Seasons Lineup On field Number of contracts 
1998-2000 5 5 5 
2001-02 6 5 8 
2005-06 6 6 6 
2007-08 7 6 7 
2008-10 8 6 8 
2010-11 8 6 10 
2011-13 8 6 unlimited 
2013-14 6 6 10 
2014-15 8 5 8 
2015-18 11 11 14 
